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CURRENT LEGISLATION
It has been pointed out that the provision of the current laws
which specifies what shall be presumed a reasonable return draws a
distinction between the owners of unencumbered property and the
owners of property held subject to mortgage. Property held free
and clear is limited to a yield of six percent of the fair value, includ-
ing land, whereas mortgaged holdings are allowed an additional two
percent "of principal for the amortization of any mortgages." It
might he argued that this differentiation denies to the owner of un-
encumbered property the equal protection of the laws. An adequate
consideration of this question goes beyond the scope of this article,
but it may be said that this is a constitutional limitation which has
been invoked with relatively infrequent success 12 and the classifica-
tion does not appear to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to violate
the provision in Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution
and in Article I, Section 11 of the constitution of the State of
New York. Relative need in the presence of the evil, no less than
the existence of the evil iiself, is a matter for the legislative judg-
ment,' 3 and the needs of holders of mortgaged real estate have already
been recognized in other emergency legislation, the mortgage mora-
torium statutes.14 Literal and precise equality in respect of some
matters is neither attainable nor required. 15 Whether owners of
mortgaged property and owners of property not so encumbered fall
within this rule remains for the courts to say.
HARRY L. DorNELLY,
JAMES L. GUILMARTIN.
RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS TO REHABILITATED FELONS.-
The amendment to Section 116 of the Executive Law 1 by the legis-
lature at the last session is a step forward in the attempt to rehabili-
tate the criminal and restore him to his place in society. The amend-
ment creates in the board of parole of the State of New York power
to restore to the convicted felon those rights and privileges of citizen-
tees are subject to the inherent pover of the state to control them if the public
interest so requires. Matter of Cohen, N. Y. L. J., May 22, 1945, p. 1943, col. 1.
12 Cf. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 48 Sup. Ct. 246 (1928) ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876); Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505
(1933); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct.
114 (1926).
13 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578
(1937).
'14L. 1933, c. 793, as amended; C. P. A. § 1077a, 1077b, 1077c, 1077cc,
1077d, 1077e, 1077f.
15 Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 561, 562, 40 Sup.
Ct. 402 (1919).
1 N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 96. Effective March 6, 1945.
1945]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ship 2 which were forfeited by the conviction.3
Citizenship itself is suspended during the actual term of sentence
in prison,4 and is revived only upon the release from prison. How-
ever, the restoration of citizenship does not revive certain civil rights 5
which are recognized as flowing from the status of citizenship. "Re-
lease from prison does not end the punishment. The convict is for-
bidden to earn his livelihood in certain professions or occupations or
to exercise some of the privileges of citizenship in the community to
which he has returned. These penalties continue, no matter how
good his subsequent behavior." 6 It is these privileges and rights which
the present amended law seeks to restore to the criminal under cer-
tain conditions.
Included in these rights which the felon forfeits by reason of his
conviction is the right to register for and vote in any election. By
statutory prohibition he also forfeits the right to practice medicine,
dentistry or podiatry, and the right to obtain a certificate as public
accountant as well as to obtain a license to conduct business as private
detective or investigator, or in connection with traffic in alcoholic
beverages. 7
2 Conviction of felony does not carry with it loss of citizenship but it
affects the felon's civil rights. Op. Arr'y GEN., 51 St. Dep't 74 (1934).
3 N. Y. CONST. Art. II, § 3 provides: ". . . the legislature shall enact laws
excluding from rights of suffrage all persons convicted of bribery or of any
infamous crime." N. Y. Pt.: LAW § 2: "A 'felony' is a crime which is or
may be punishable by: (1) death; or, (2) imprisonment in a state prison."
The word "convicted" refers to a judgment of conviction, and one who
has pleaded guilty, or against whom a verdict of guilty was rendered by a
judge is not disqualified where no judgment is entered thereon. People v.
Fabian, 192 N. Y. 443, 85 N. E. 672 (1908).
4 Citizenship itself is lost during the actual term of sentence in prison.
Op. Arr'y GEN. (1915) 76, construing Section 510 of the N. Y. Penal Law:
"A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term less than for life,
forfeits all the public offices, and suspends during the term of the sentence, all
the civil rights, and all private trusts, authority, or powers of, or held by, the
person sentenced."
5 " 'Civil rights', as distinguished from rights which are naturally inherent,
are those defined and given by positive law enacted for the maintenance of
government." Green v. State of New York, 251 App. Div. 108, 110, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 672, 674 (1937).
6 Cf. The Governor's message to the legislature (Jan. 1, 1945).
7 N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 1251; § 1311, subd. 13; § 1412, subd. 8; § 1496; N. Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 74; N .Y. ALco. BEv. CONT. LAW § 126, subds. 1, 4; N. Y.
PEN. LAW § 510-a; N. Y. ELEc. LAW § 152.
The reinstatement of any attorney, disbarred because of a conviction of
felony, was advisedly excluded from the purview of the present enactment
since the right of determining the qualifications of those engaged in the legal
profession is the exclusive function of the courts. JUDIc. LAW § 88; It re
Graduates of the Law Department of the U. of N. Y., 10 Abb. Pr. 348, 31
Barb. 353 (N. Y. 1860). The courts, in view of the implicit trust and integrity
demanded of an attorney, have always required, as a prerequisite to reinstate-
ment to the bar, a pardon, and in addition, a factual demonstration of innocence
of the original crime. Matter of Kaufman, 245 N. Y. 423, 157 N. E. 730
(1927) ; In re Finn, 256 App. Div. 288, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 29 (1939).
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By amendment of those statutes 8 which specifically created these
disabilities, otherwise perpetual, the legislature has limited them to a
fixed term. They are made mandatory only for a period of five con-
secutive years after release of the convicted felon from the sentence
imposed.9 At the end of the period so fixed the released felon may
apply to the board of parole for a removal of any or all of these statu-
tory disabilities. Upon satisfactory proof of sufficient rehabilitation
and good conduct during the period fixed, as well as any prior period,
the board of parole may, by the discretionary power vested in it by
the new law,1 end the disability and restore the criminal to these
particular civil rights.
This newly created power which is now vested in the parole
board, although not a pardon, partakes of the nature of a limited
executive pardon. The governor alone has the right to pardon.11
Pardon is an act of executive clemency and is a matter of grace and
not of right, an act of mercy, not of justice. 12  The present legisla-
tive enactment, therefore, may be said to be a gift to the convicted
felon. In so legislating, it was felt that progress could be made in
rehabilitating the criminal by a liberal policy in offering to deserving
persons convicted of crime an opportunity to enjoy the full rights of
citizenship. While an application for pardon is still his privilege,
the criminal is now given a more efficient method to replace the often,
lengthy and cumbersome procedure inherent in the exercise of the
power of pardon.
The board of parole is eminently equipped 13 to deal with the
s Ibid.
9 N. Y. ExFc. LAW § 116, subd. 3: "The period of five consecutive years
with respect to any person shall be measured either from the date of the
payment of any fine imposed upon him or the suspension of sentence, or from
the date of his unrevoked release from custody by parole, commutation or
termination of his sentence, provided that no such certificate shall be granted
to any person while subject to parole supervision."
Art. 8 of the Correction Law, dealing with parole, provides only for the
physical liberation of a prisoner so long as he complies with the conditions of
his parole. It does not, unlike a commutation of sentence, result in termina-
tion of the sentence and the 'restoration of civil rights. Matter of Lehrman
v. State of N. Y., 176 Misc. 1022, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 635 (1941).
ION. Y. ExEc. LAW § 116.
11 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 4: "The governor shall have power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, . . . upon such condi-
tions and with such restrictions, as he may think proper, subject to such regu-
lations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for
pardons."
See N. Y. CODE OF CGIm. PRoc. § 692.
12 An executive pardon does not obliterate the judicial finding of the guilt
of the offense which has been pardoned. People ex re. Prisament v. Brophy,
287 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. (2d) 468 (1941).
Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678 (1899).
13 Similar procedural matters to be met with in the exercise of the new
power, regarding investigation of the criminal, were in the past entrusted to
the board of parole in connection with the governor's exercise of the pardon
power.
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situation presented by the new law. It consists of three members
appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate.1 4  Its
primary function of close supervision and control of the convict' 5
while on parole, renders it a suitable fiduciary to which to entrust the
cautious exercise of this quasi-executive power of pardon created by
the new law.
There are also safeguards inherent in the law itself. The appli-
cant has the burden of offering satisfactory proof of conduct warrant-
ing the restoration of his civil rights. Such proof must be approved
by the unanimous vote of the parole board. As evidence of its ap-
proval the board grants to the applicant a certificate attesting his good
conduct during the five-year period after the legal termination of his
sentence. Here also the board may exercise its discretion by limit-
ing the certificate so as to remove only one or more, and not all of
the disabilities imposed by law.16 This certificate, as evidence of
good moral character, is to be granted only where such evidence is
required by law, or where the law provides that it will end a disability
otherwise imposed.'7
The right to register for and vote at any election is restored to
the convic: upon the granting of the certificate of good conduct, unless
the certificate expressly provides otherwise.'i However, in restor-
ing the rights and privileges of pursuing those professions and occu-
'pations 19 not specifically excluded, the certificate granted for this
purpose removes the disability and no more. These rights are re-
stored upon condition subsequent. The power of the parole board
N. Y. ExEc. LAW § 116, subd. 2: "The board of parole shall also have the
powers and perform the duties, when requested by the governor, of collecting
the records, making investigations and reporting to the governor, the facts,
circumstances, criminal records and social, physical, mental and psychiatric
conditions and histories of prisoners under consideration by the governor' as to
pardon or commutation of sentence..."
14 The board of parole, as presently constituted, was created in 1930. N. Y.
EXEc. LAW § 115. However, parole was first instituted in New York in 1889.
The establishment of the N. Y. State Reformatory at Elmira in 1876 presented
the first opportunity for development of a parole system in the United States.
Cf. BATES, PRISONS AND BEYOND (1936) 246; PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNOR'S
CONFERENCE ON CRIME, THE CRIMINAL AND SOCIETY, Albany, N Y, 1935..
'5 N. Y. CoRREc. LAW Art. 8.
26 N. Y. ExEc. LAW § 116, subd. 3.
17 Ibid.
is N. Y. PEN. LAW § 510-a: "No person who has been convicted of a
felony shall have the right to register for or vote at any election, except as
provided in section one hundred fifty-two of the election law . . . nor shall
prohibition to vote in any election extend to any person who shall have received
a certificate of good conduct granted by the board of parole . . ."
N. Y. ELEC. LAW § 152: ". . . No person who has been convicted of a
felony shall have the right to register for or vote at any election unless he
shall have been pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the gover-
nor, or received a certificate of good conduct granted by the board of parole
pursuant to the provisions of the executive law to remove the disability under
this section because of such conviction . .
19 See note 7 supra.
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to restore these rights is conditioned by the exercise of another estab-
lished power. The new law places no restraint upon the lawful dis-
cretion and power to be exercised by the licensing authority, which
may grant or refuse the license or certificate necessary to legally
pursue such profession or occupation.20 The ultimate authority in
such cases is therefore the licensing authority. In this way abuses
are prevented, and the high ethical standards which the legislature
has set for the medical and dental professions and the safeguards
provided by statute to protect the public are preserved.
21
It is submitted that the present law will serve to further the
progressive attitude which the State of New York has always taken
in attempting to solve the two-fold problem of crime prevention and
punishment. The punishment attached to a crime serves to punish
the criminal, to act as a deterrent to others, and to protect society.
Rehabilitation of the criminal should begin where punishment ends,
and it is the duty.of society to give him an opportunity to prove his
ability to become once again a law-abiding, self-supporting member
of the community. The present emergency created by the war has
afforded him this opportunity 2 as never before, and he has, for the
most part, earned the trust placed in him to do so. The inference of
this new law is that the criminal, if proven fit, should be admitted to
the full rights and privileges of citizenship.
JOHN E. PERRY.
UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANcE-NEw YORK "MERIT RATING"
LAw.-In March, 1945 the New York State Legislature, by amend-
ing the Unemployment Insurance Law, passed what is popularly
20 N. Y. ExEc. LAw § 116, subd. 3: ". . . Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent or limit any licensing board, body or authority from
exercising its lawful discretion or power in either granting or refusing a license
to a person to whom such certificate shall have been granted."
In construing § 126 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, the Attorney
General held that the state liquor authority is not prohibited from granting a
license to an applicant previously convicted of a felony, but subsequently
pardoned. The fact that the applicant had been once convicted may, however,
be taken into consideration, in determining whether or not a license should be
issued. Op. ATr'Y GEN. (1934) 116.
It has been held that a pardon, issued under constitutional power, to a
doctor convicted of manslaughter, whose license to practice medicine was
thereby revoked, does not restore the right to practice, though the pardon
purports to restore all the rights and privileges forfeited by the conviction.
State v. Hazard, 139 Wash. 487, 247 Pac. 957 (1926).
21 In considering the purpose of Section 74 of the N. Y. General Business
Law, which deals with the issuance of licenses to private detectives and investi-
gators, the courts declared its purpose to be "the protection of the public at
large and to prevent from engaging in that business disreputable, incompetent
persons who would prey on the public." Shorten v. Millbank, 170 Misc. 905,
11 N. Y. (2d) 387 (1939).
22 Cf. Article, "Men with Criminal Records Make Good in the Army,"
Col. E. S. Shattuck, Gen'l Counsel, Sel. Serv.; 99th Annual Report of Prison
Association of New York, Lwois. Doc. No. 27 (1944).
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